The Ban Bus

A real irony was one of the points of concern from some governments. They complained that during the final day’s position statements there was clapping for countries who made good strong statements calling for a total ban. One of the most vocal to complain of this was the Canadian diplomat Earl Turcotte. He made a very strong attack on this in his closing statement and in general about NGO inclusion. Sadly he was an NGO himself before he joined government and used to be a strong supporter of the actions of civil society. How ones morals change once they join government and take the government wage packet. The irony came when we reviewed the filming from within the final meeting – here was the Canadian delegation clapping for some statements – so their complaints can only be seen as a cynical attempt to have us locked out. Oh the games and lengths that governments will go to to make sure this process stays behind closed doors.

The night the Wellington conference finished the NGO community had a get together at a local boat shed and who should turn up thinking he was still a bit of an NGO? None other than Earl. I was amazed no one tossed him in the harbour.

There is a sad cowardice from some governments that try to look like they are doing the right thing then do their damnedest to undermine a strong treaty. This seems to be particularly popular tactic from the likes of most of the problem European countries and Australia. They are often referred to as trying to look ‘good but, smell bad’.

The Australians fall within this category along with Germany, the UK and a handful of others. They call themselves ‘The Like Minded’ group and are doing a lot of work to create a strong treaty for everyone except themselves. They have a vested interest in the treaty having holes that will allow no cluster bombs, except theirs, or not to be able to use them, but allowing their military allies to use them. If these exceptions are included then the treaty will be very weak in a practical sense and the next war will be a Déjà vu of the last one.

So much of the nature of diplomacy is to have a long winded talk fest that ends in status quo. This is a common outcome from many a UN meeting. They come, they talk, they congratulate each other, they drink the free cocktails and they agree to disagree. Such is the nature of much so called diplomacy. This process must be different.

The argument about interoperability is an interesting one. The governments that want exceptions on degrees of use are trying to cloud the negotiations with a myriad of ‘but what if’s’. If a weapon system is deemed unacceptable and is banned then how can you argue for an exception of use under certain partnerships. An easy way to look at this is to replace the term ‘cluster bomb’ with terms like ‘poison gas’ or ‘torture’.

If a coalition partner country decides to torture people do we agree with them doing this? Of course not. If a coalition partner decides to use poison gas in a conflict then do we agree to this? No. So why is a treaty that’s to ban cluster bombs different? You can not decree a weapon is unacceptable then have loopholes and exceptions for use under certain conditions. The treaty must not be half cocked. It’s like being half dead or a little bit pregnant. You are either dead, pregnant or have a strong treaty. Nothing more and nothing less.

The process to create this treaty has come to be known as the Oslo Process. It’s a copy of the landmine treaty from eleven years ago and then it was known as the Ottawa Process. It’s a method of creating a treaty that is totally outside of any United Nations treaty process. The big difference lies between a process of opt in or consensus.

The United Nations treaties are treaties of consensus. This means that the world will come together at a conference to attempt to deal with an issue. They will talk about it over a week or so in very neutral and diplomatic ways and then if they all agree a treaty might emerge. The problem lies in that they all must agree. If someone doesn’t like it then all bets are off and the treaty will not go ahead. That is consensus. Unfortunately there is rarely any consensus.

The Oslo Process works differently. It’s an opt in process. The aim is to convene an international meeting and invite the world to come and talk. Over a series of meetings all the issues relating to a treaty are worked through. Finally the last meeting will be the treaty creation itself. This will normally take a few weeks of hard core legal word battling through the text that will become the final legal document. Finally a treaty will be the end result and then all nations will be encouraged to sign it. Normally it will not be open for signing till many months after the treaty text has been created. This will give all countries the chance to go back to their capital cities and digest the responsibility of the treaty.

This is the process that was created and followed in 1997 that became the Landmine Ban Treaty. It’s the same process that we are following now in the creation of this treaty. Since 1997 we went from few countries being interested in a treaty to now 156. That’s a massive success and even the few countries that have not signed are virtually not using, selling or manufacturing landmines. Now that is a success in progress.

This is what we want to do now. Fight through the process for a strong and field focused functional treaty and then work on the universalisation of it. That’s to say, educate all the countries of the world about the problem of cluster bombs and get them to sign onto the treaty. This is not an overnight way to make a treaty but it’s the best way to make a strong treaty. With a choice of this method or the UN method, this method is designed to achieve a positive outcome and actually be successful.